The Distortive Effects of Too Big To Fail: Evidence from the Danish Market for Retail Deposits
利用丹麦个人存款账户数据和存款保险限额变化，研究发现系统性重要银行在危机中通过降低利率仍能吸引未保险存款，导致非系统性银行贷款减少，揭示了太大而不能倒担保对零售存款市场的扭曲效应。
Abstract We study the impact of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees on the market for retail deposits. Exploiting information about all personal deposit accounts in Denmark and salient changes to the deposit insurance limit, we provide evidence that systemically important banks successfully retain and attract uninsured deposits in a crisis at the expense of other banks even as they differentially lower their interest rates. The funding shock suffered by nonsystemic banks causes a decrease in their lending. The results point to the distortive effects of TBTF guarantees in the market for retail deposits. Received March 15, 2018; editorial decision January 15, 2019 by Philip Strahan.