Bargaining and News
研究了买方在不知卖方成本的情况下，通过频繁出价并利用“新闻”逐步学习卖方类型的过程，发现买方从谈判中获取额外收益的能力极为有限。
We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We show that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In fact, the buyer gains nothing from the ability to negotiate a better price despite the fact that a negotiation must take place in equilibrium. During the negotiation, the buyer engages in a form of costly “experimentation” by making offers that are sure to earn her negative payoffs if accepted, but speed up learning and improve her continuation payoff if rejected. We investigate the effects of market power by comparing our results to a setting with competitive buyers. Both efficiency and the seller’s payoff can decrease by introducing competition among buyers.