Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law
利用1995至2013年企业注册数据，实证分析企业在惯性下选择公司法的行为，发现多数企业厌恶保护主义法律，而内华达州的崛起源于小企业的偏好。
This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995 to 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws.