Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?
研究了17个OECD国家中央行独立性与反通胀可信度的关系，发现独立性并未降低反通胀成本或抑制铸币税收入与选举操纵，质疑了独立性降低通胀的常见解释。
Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. The paper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflation are lower in countries with independent central banks. It also finds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignorage revenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These results raise questions about some explanations of the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation.