Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents
构建了一个包含行为偏差（如错误认知和内部性）的一般框架，重新审视了最优税收的三大支柱（拉姆齐、庇古、米尔利斯），并展示了如何将助推纳入最优税收体系，为政策制定者提供了修正后的税收公式和新见解。
This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general framework that encompasses a wide range of biases such as misperceptions and internalities. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities), and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation framework, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges.