Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
研究了动态环境下存在道德风险时的最优监控设计，发现当信息是主要关注点时最优监控为定期审查，当激励是主要关注点时最优监控为随机检查。
Abstract We study the design of monitoring in dynamic settings with moral hazard. An agent (e.g. a firm) benefits from reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent’s quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent’s reputation, and an informational role because the principal directly values the information. We characterize the optimal monitoring policy inducing full effort. When information is the principal’s main concern, optimal monitoring is deterministic with periodic reviews. When incentive provision is the main concern, optimal monitoring is random with a constant hazard rate.