The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes
利用美国人口普查局的工厂级数据，研究对冲基金激进主义对企业生产率的长期影响，发现目标企业在干预后3年内生产效率提升，出售的工厂在新所有者下生产率显著提高，但员工工时和工资停滞。
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on firm productivity using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves production efficiency in the 3 years after intervention, with stronger improvements in business strategy-oriented interventions. Plants sold after intervention improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that capital redeployment is an important channel for value creation. Employees of target firms experience stagnation in work hours and wages despite an increase in labor productivity. Additional tests refute alternative explanations attributing the improvement to mean reversion, management's voluntary reforms, industry consolidation shocks, or activists' stock-picking abilities.