Storability, Market Structure, and Demand-Shift Incentives
构建两期模型，分析买方提前储存商品以套利时，市场结构如何影响跨期价格路径。主要发现是寡头垄断下价格先低后高，而垄断和完全竞争无此动态。
We consider a 2-period model in which buyers can store the good- purchasing in advance of consumption so as to realize potential gains from inter-temporal price arbitrage- and examine the impact of market structure on the resulting inter-temporal price path and allocation. The main result is that when supply is oligopolistic (quantity setting) and consumers are sufficiently patient (storage costs are not prohibitive) then, in equilibrium, the price path must be increasing, with a “sale ” price in period 1, and a “regular ” price in period 2. This price dynamic arises because each firm has a strong current incentive to capture future market share from a rival, and it occurs in conjunction with rational in-advance purchase by buyers. In contrast, the monopoly and perfectly competitive price paths exhibit no such endogenous price dynamic.