Rational Information Leakage
构建交易模型，研究知情交易者（如内幕人）为何自愿向独立交易者泄露资产价值信息，发现泄露虽削弱信息优势但增强执行价格优势，在足够多知情交易者时泄露有利可图，并讨论对内幕交易监管的启示。
Empirical evidence suggests that information leakage in capital markets is common. We present a trading model to study the incentives of an informed trader (e.g., a well-informed insider) to voluntarily leak information about an asset’s value to one or more independent traders. Our model shows that, although leaking information dissipates the insider’s information advantage about the asset’s value, it enhances his information advantage about the asset’s execution price relative to other informed traders. The profit impact of these two effects are countervailing. When there are a sufficient number of other informed traders, the profit impact from enhanced information dominates. Hence, the insider has incentives to leak some of his private information. We label this rational information leakage and discuss its implications for the regulation of insider trading. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.