Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership
研究随机合伙关系中，当玩家可以匿名退出并重新匹配时，社会福利最大化的均衡如何导致一种“约会”过程，使所有伙伴充分实现匹配的潜在均衡收益，并与非随机重复博弈中的结果形成对比。
Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a “dating” process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains. Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also provided, consistent with documented patterns of “survivorship bias” and “honeymoon.”