Strategic Alliances and the Boundaries of the Firm
构建并检验了一个模型，解释企业为何有时偏好战略联盟而非内部组织，通过引入管理层努力，说明联盟有助于克服总部无法预先承诺资本分配时的激励问题。
Strategic alliances are long-term contracts between legally distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. In this paper, I develop and test a model that helps explain why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally organized projects. I introduce managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets and show how strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations. The model generates a number of implications, which I test using a large sample of alliance transactions in conjunction with Compustat data. , Oxford University Press.