An extortionary guerrilla movement
用无限期马尔可夫决策过程模型化管道运营商与游击运动之间的勒索关系，基于管道攻击数据估计模型，发现游击运动的攻击模式与勒索行为一致。
Abstract This paper models an extortionary relationship between a pipeline operator and a guerrilla movement. Payment and attack decisions are modeled as an infinite‐horizon Markov decision process, where each period the oil company chooses to pay or not pay an extortion demand and the movement decides to attack or not. Decisions depend on the level of single‐period payoff and discounted expected future payoffs. We estimate the model with pipeline attack data and compare parameters when the discount factor is changed. We reject a zero discount factor hypothesis, demonstrating that the movement's observed attack pattern is compatible with extortionary behavior. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.