State‐Owned Enterprises, Competition, and Disclosure
研究了一个国有企业与私人企业竞争的混合寡头模型，发现当国企足够重视社会福利且市场竞争度低时，它会完全披露私有信息，否则选择隐瞒；此时私人企业与国企竞争可能比与另一私企竞争更有利可图。
ABSTRACT We develop a mixed‐duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed about market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE commits to fully disclose its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to withhold its private information. When the disclosure equilibrium prevails, the private firm can be more profitable competing against an SOE than against another private firm. In this mixed‐duopoly setting, the equilibrium social welfare is maximized when the SOE puts a positive weight on both social welfare and its own profit. Our analysis has further implications for both mandatory disclosure and market entry.