Framework Agreements in Procurement: An Auction Model and Design Recommendations
研究了采购中框架协议的成本不确定性，发现其存在赢家诅咒导致采购价高于即时拍卖，并提出了价格监控、成本指数和降价灵活性等降低采购价的设计建议。
Framework agreements (FAs) are procurement mechanisms commonly used by buying agencies around the world to satisfy demand that arises over a certain time horizon. This paper is one of the first in the literature that provides a formal understanding of FAs, with a particular focus on the cost uncertainty bidders face over the FA time horizon. We generalize standard auction models to include this salient feature of FAs and analyze this model theoretically and numerically. First, we show that FAs are subject to a sort of winner’s curse that in equilibrium induces higher expected buying prices relative to running first-price auctions as needs arise. Then, our results provide concrete design recommendations that alleviate this issue and decrease buying prices in FAs, highlighting the importance of (i) monitoring the price charged at the open market by the FA winner to bound the buying price; (ii) implementing price indexes for the random part of suppliers’ costs; and (iii) allowing suppliers the flexibility to reduce their prices to compete with the open market throughout the selling horizon. These prescriptions are already being used by the Chilean government procurement agency that buys US$2 billion worth of contracts yearly using FAs. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0623 .