Altering the terms of executive stock options
研究高管股票期权重置条款的实践，发现多数期权按平价重置，行权价平均下降40%，重置对期权事前价值影响小但事后收益大，且与公司业绩负相关。
We examine the practice of resetting the terms of previously-issued executive stock options. We identify properties of reset options, develop a model for valuing resettable options, and characterize the "rms that have reset options. We "nd the vast majority of options are reset at-the-money, resulting, on average, in the strike price dropping 40%. Our valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex-ante value of an option award, but the ex-post gain can be substantial. Finally, we "nd resetting has a strong negative relation with "rm performance even after correcting for industry