The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets
研究买方在公开拍卖中如何设定保留价，以及供应商合并对买方福利的影响。发现合并后买方降低保留价可部分抵消价格效应，但仍因内部生产成本上升而损害福利。
The buyer solicits bids from suppliers with different cost distributions defined by their capacities. The expected market share of each supplier is the ratio of its capacity to the industry capacity. The buyer's optimal reserve price declines with increases in the concentration of the industry. The lower reserve price can partially or fully offset the price effects of a merger. However, a merger still reduces the buyer's welfare because there is an increased probability of internal production at a higher cost. The lower reserve price can also undermine the incentive for larger suppliers to merge and result in stable industry structures for which no further mergers would be profitable.