CEO Power and Relative Performance Evaluation
研究了当CEO有权影响相对绩效评估设计时，董事会更少使用该机制，并预测了CEO部分降低共同风险、董事会放弃RPE的条件，为检测强式与弱式RPE提供了新解释和CEO权力的新度量。
Abstract We model relative performance evaluation ( RPE ) when a Chief Executive Officer ( CEO ) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index‐based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer‐group performance. As a consequence, the Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE . Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEO s choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (i) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong‐form and weak‐form RPE in the presence of powerful CEO s, and (ii) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.