Reputation and turnover
研究双寡头重复博弈中，企业私下投资质量，低质量实现会通过降低未来需求来惩罚，分析这种更替均衡何时优于静态均衡及其与市场基本面的关系。
We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on turnover equilibria in which a low‐quality realization is penalized by lowering future demand of the firm that delivered this quality. We determine when a turnover equilibrium that gives higher welfare than the static equilibrium exists and how this relates to market fundamentals. We also derive comparative statics properties, and we characterize a set of investment levels and, hence, payoffs that turnover equilibria sustain .