Institutional Liquidity Needs and the Structure of Monitored Finance: Table 1
分析监督企业的金融机构在自身有流动性需求时，因信息不对称面临逆向选择成本，发现机构偏好持有债务而非股权以减少成本，而依赖监督融资的企业也倾向于向监督机构发行债务。
A financial institution that finances and monitors firms learns private information about these firms. When the institution seeks funds to meet its own liquidity needs, it faces adverse selection ("liquidity") costs that increase with the risk of its claims on these firms. The institution can reduce its liquidity costs by holding debt rather than equity. Conversely, except in a limited setting resembling venture capital, firms that depend on monitored finance prefer to give the monitoring institution debt rather than equity. Institutions with less frequent or less severe liquidity needs have greater appetite for equity and for the debt of more risky borrowers. These predictions are consistent with general patterns of monitored finance. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.