Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Financing, and Payout Policies
研究在资本市场的逆向选择和管理层机会主义同时存在时，公司如何选择发行和分红政策，发现决策权归属（股东还是管理层）会显著影响最优融资和信号机制的选择。
We examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection (in capital markets) and managerial opportunism. Our results establish the importance of the locus of decision control in the firm. When shareholders determine policies, debt financing is always optimal in the presence of either adverse selection or managerial opportunism. However, when both of these problems are simultaneously present, equity issuance can become an optimal signaling mechanism. Shareholders' most preferred signaling mechanism is restricting dividends, followed by equity financing, and finally underpricing securities. When managers determine policies, a reversed hierarchy may be obtained.