Asymmetric Information, Portfolio Managers, and Home Bias
构建了一个委托资产管理模型，解释国际市场中本土偏好、国内投资共同基金比例较低但市值较高的现象。模型认为投资者对国内信息更了解，使国内投资风险更低，且高能力经理专攻国内资产，放大了本土偏好。
We propose a model of delegated asset management that can explain the following empirical regularities in international markets: the presence of home bias, the lower proportion of mutual funds investing domestically, and the higher market value of mutual funds investing domestically. In the model, fund managers choose whether to specialize in domestic or foreign assets. Individual investors are uncertain about managers' abilities, and they are more informed about domestic markets. This makes domestic investments less risky and generates home bias. Home bias is magnified because higher-ability managers specialize in domestic assets, making them even more attractive to the investors. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.