Ownership and Control of German Corporations
研究发现德国公司董事会更替与业绩强相关，但所有权集中与管理层约束关联弱，金字塔结构控制证据有限；控制权转移收益仅归大股东，少数投资者未获益。
In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.