Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices
通过田野实验发现，当承诺选择公开而非私密时，人们更可能选择放弃金钱以约束自己未来行为，表明除时间不一致外，向他人传递信号的动机也会驱动对承诺技术的需求。
Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one’s future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates. Data are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.