Information Acquisition in Rumor‐Based Bank Runs
研究了谣言传播时，储户如何获取信息并决定是否挤兑一家有偿付能力但流动性不足的银行，发现公开偿付能力信息可减少挤兑。
ABSTRACT We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent‐but‐illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding‐out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.