Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism
利用德国巴伐利亚州1995年引入地方倡议权的自然实验，结合双重差分和断点回归方法，发现更强的直接民主制度导致地方政府规模扩大。
Abstract In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference‐in‐differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre‐ and post‐reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference‐in‐discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.