Executive Suite Independence: Is It Related to Board Independence?
研究利用外部冲击提高董事会独立性，发现这反而削弱了高管团队独立性，因为CEO通过任命和社交联系加强了与高管的关联，且两者存在替代关系。
The executive suite and the board are closely bound to each other through their fiduciary responsibility to the same shareholders. With chief executive officers’ (CEOs) prominent role in both governing bodies, their independence from CEOs’ self-serving behavior might be related to each other. We explore the interdependence using an external shock increasing board independence. The shock weakens executive suite independence by increasing CEO connectedness within executive suites through appointments and preexisting social ties. We also uncover interesting dynamics between the two governing bodies: (1) the spillover does not occur when treated firms increase CEO-independent director social ties, suggesting CEO-executive connections and CEO-director connections are substitutes; (2) consistent with theories of board independence, when an information environment calls for dependent boards, increasing CEO-executive connections, which helps negate the shock effect on the board, has positive marginal effects on firm performance. Our findings are not driven by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and are robust to a battery of other tests. We conclude that independence in the board and executive suite are inversely related; inferring the overall independence from board independence alone can be highly misleading. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2603 . This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.