Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?
研究了1988-2002年间工会通过提交股东提案进行股东行动主义的影响，发现整体样本无显著模式，但在工会存在且提案获股东投票支持时，对目标公司有显著效应。
Abstract We examine the impact of labor union shareholder activism through the submission of shareholder proposals during the period 1988–2002. We examine the effect of labor union‐sponsored shareholder proposals on announcement period returns; on the corporate governance environment of the firm including shareholder rights, board composition, and CEO compensation; on changes in unionization rates and labor expense; and on long‐run shareholder wealth. We do not find any observable patterns for the overall sample of proposals. However, subsets of proposals associated with union presence at the target firm and shareholder voting support for the proposal are associated with significant effects surrounding and subsequent to targeting.