The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy
提出一种政治体制分类法，区分产权、政治权利和公民权利三组权利，指出自由民主的独特之处在于保护公民权利，并说明精英与多数人之间的民主转型通常无法产生自由民主，而低不平等和弱身份分裂是其出现的前提。
Abstract This paper develops a taxonomy of political regimes that distinguishes between three sets of rights—property rights, political rights and civil rights. The truly distinctive nature of liberal democracy is the protection of civil rights (equal treatment by the state for all groups) in addition to the other two. The paper shows how democratic transitions that are the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care about political rights), generically fail to produce liberal democracy. Instead, the emergence of liberal democracy requires low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages.