Dynamic Contract Breach
研究了在多个时间点可能违约时最优违约金的设计，解释了为何某些服务（如酒店预订）的取消费随时间递增，并讨论了减损激励。
This article studies the design of optimal liquidated damages when breach of contract is possible at multiple points in time. It offers an intuitive explanation for why cancellation fees for some services (e.g., hotel reservations) increase as the time for performance approaches and discusses the incentives to mitigate damages. It is shown that absent externalities, privately stipulated damages induce socially efficient breach and investment decisions, regardless of whether renegotiation is possible. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.