Insolvency Resolution and the Missing High-Yield Bond Markets
研究了低效破产程序如何迫使有生存能力但资不抵债的企业进行庭外重组，导致银行占据谈判优势，进而抑制高收益债券发行，为破产改革与债券市场关联提供证据。
In many countries, poorly functioning bankruptcy procedures force viable but insolvent firms to restructure out of court, where banks may have a bargaining advantage over other creditors. We model the choice of restructuring process and derive implications for the corporate mix of bank and bond financing. Empirical patterns match the model: inefficient bankruptcy in a country is associated with less bond issuance by risky, but not by safe, borrowers. This pattern holds for both levels of and changes in bankruptcy recovery. Our results establish a link between bankruptcy reform and corporate bond markets, especially high-yield markets. Received September 29, 2014; accepted February 1, 2016 by Editor David Denis.