SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CRIME DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN FACILITATING DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR*
研究个体在社交网络中如何决定是否成为罪犯以及犯罪投入程度，发现网络结构会导致多重均衡，不同犯罪人数和犯罪水平可能共存。
Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know‐how on the crime business. We study the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals.