Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
分析当经理人拥有高私人收益但持股较少时，经理人与工人会结成联盟抵御收购威胁，通过长期劳动合同和拒绝出售股份等方式降低公司对收购者的吸引力，并预测工资与经理人持股负相关、收购后工资下降。
ABSTRACT If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a “shark repellent” through long‐term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as “white squires” for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.