Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk
研究发现，当企业投资机会相关时，股东与经理的风险分担会导致薪酬合同包含相对业绩评估，从而偏向相关投资并产生系统性风险，杠杆会放大这些效应。在银行业背景下，分析了政策建议如何被股东最优地抵消。
Abstract We show that, in the presence of correlated investment opportunities across firms, risk sharing between firm shareholders and firm managers leads to compensation contracts that include relative performance evaluation. These contracts bias investment choices toward correlated investment opportunities, and thus create systemic risk. Furthermore, we show that leverage amplifies all such effects. In the context of the banking industry, we analyze recent policy recommendations for firm managerial pay and show how shareholders optimally undo the policies’ intended effects. Received October 31, 2017; editorial decision August 21, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.