Sell-Side Information Production in Financial Markets
研究了在存在交易机会时，卖方出售非排他性私人信息的决策，发现卖方信息生产促进市场效率，但存在投资不足问题，而基于费用的咨询报酬可缓解此问题。
Abstract We study decisions to sell nonexcludable private information in the presence of a trading opportunity. Sell-side agents heighten competition among agents who buy their signals to combine with their own for proprietary trading purposes and thereby promote financial market efficiency. This result holds even when the sell-side production technology is not unique. But sell-side information is subject to underinvestment if producers do not internalize the benefits. The model suggests that fee-based compensation for corporate advisory services diminishes this problem and that market efficiency is undermined by forces steering investment-banking resources toward proprietary trading.