The Science of Monetary Policy: An Imperfect Knowledge Perspective
从不完全知识视角重新评估新凯恩斯范式下的货币政策设计，发现理性预期下的基本逻辑仍成立，但完美知识和学习会限制央行可选政策，使预期管理更难；不过，价格水平目标制和利率政策惯性在理性预期下很重要，在不完全知识下也依然稳健。
This paper reevaluates the basic prescriptions of monetary policy design in the new Keynesian paradigm through the lens of imperfect knowledge. We show that while the basic logic of monetary policy design under rational expectations continues to obtain, perfect knowledge and learning can limit the set of policies available to central banks, rendering expectations management in general more difficult. Nonetheless, the desirability of some form of price-level targeting, inducing inertia in interest-rate policy, paramount under rational expectations, is robust to the assumption of imperfect knowledge.