Political Representation and Governance: Evidence from the Investment Decisions of Public Pension Funds
研究发现，由州官员担任的养老基金董事会代表与私募股权投资表现负相关，尽管这些官员有较强的金融教育背景；表现不佳部分源于政治权宜之计的投资决策，且与金融行业的政治捐款正相关。
ABSTRACT Representation on pension fund boards by state officials—often determined by statute decades past—is negatively related to the performance of private equity investments made by the pension fund, despite state officials’ relatively strong financial education and experience. Their underperformance appears to be partly driven by poor investment decisions consistent with political expediency, and is also positively related to political contributions from the finance industry. Boards dominated by elected rank‐and‐file plan participants also underperform, but to a smaller extent and due to these trustees’ lesser financial experience.