Scarcity without Leviathan: The Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War
研究在缺乏中央权威的市场中，稀缺是否加剧暴力。以墨西哥可卡因贸易为例，发现哥伦比亚缉获导致的可卡因短缺会推高价格并增加墨西哥暴力，尤其在美国边境、多贩毒集团和执政党支持强的地区。
Abstract This paper asks whether scarcity increases violence in markets that lack a centralized authority. We construct a model in which, by raising prices, scarcity fosters violence. Guided by our model, we examine this effect in the Mexican cocaine trade. At a monthly frequency, scarcity created by cocaine seizures in Colombia, Mexico's main cocaine supplier, increases violence in Mexico. The effects are larger in municipalities near the United States, with multiple cartels and with strong support for PAN (the incumbent party). Between 2006 and 2009 the decline in cocaine supply from Colombia could account for 10% to 14% of the increase in violence in Mexico.