Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs
基于产业地理集中的观察，提出贸易保护的政治经济学模型，说明战略委托导致每个选区选出比中位选民更保护主义的代表，从而立法机构设定正关税。
Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.