Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods
研究了在信任品市场中，保险覆盖程度的变化如何影响医生欺诈行为，发现提高共保率可能减少或增加欺诈和患者寻求第二意见的概率。
Abstract We study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician‐patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by pretending to perform inappropriately high treatment levels leading to overcharging patients. Our approach aims on the impact on changes in each, patients' and physicians' incentive structure when the proportional degree of coinsurance varies. It is shown that a higher coinsurance rate may lead to either less fraud in the market and a lower probability of patients searching for second opinions or more fraud and more searches.