Third‐degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality
研究垄断航空公司在存在拥堵外部性时对商务和休闲乘客实行三级价格歧视的福利效应，发现时间估值效应可能使歧视定价在总产出下降时仍能改善福利。
Abstract This paper analyzes third‐degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served. The model features the business‐passenger and leisure‐passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation, and a less price‐elastic demand, than leisure passengers. Our main result is the identification of the time‐valuation effect of price discrimination, which can work in the opposite direction as the well‐known output effect on welfare. This time‐valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output.