Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
通过实验室实验，研究了在不完美监督（行动只能被噪音观察）下，沟通如何影响合作。发现事前沟通能减少战略不确定性并促进初期高合作率，但重复沟通对维持不完美监督下的高合作水平至关重要。
Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, this is sufficient to reach a high and stable cooperation rate. However, repeated communication is important to maintain a high level of cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where players face additional uncertainty about the history of play.