Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
研究美国第六代视频游戏行业（2000-2005）中，平台纵向整合与排他性软件合约对行业结构和福利的影响，发现若禁止排他性，硬件和软件销量将分别增长7%和58%，消费者福利增加15亿美元。
This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the US video game industry (2000–2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software demand for hardware platforms. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes had platforms been unable to own or contract exclusively with software. Driven by increased software compatibility, hardware and software sales would have increased by 7 percent and 58 percent and consumer welfare by $1.5 billion. Gains would be realized only by the incumbent, suggesting exclusivity favored the entrant platforms.