The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
建模了多元化企业内部权力斗争导致的资源错配，发现当部门间资源与机会差异增大时，资金可能流向最无效的部门，造成低效投资和企业价值下降，并用1980-1993年美国多元化企业数据验证了该预测。
We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them.