Loss aversion in social image concerns
通过实验室实验，研究人们在社会形象（如智力排名）中是否也存在损失厌恶，发现排名下降的人比排名上升的人更可能通过撒谎来改善排名，且从损失到收益的转变处撒谎行为存在不连续性。
Abstract Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.