标准型博弈中的认知与行为:一项实验研究

Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

Econometrica · 2001
被引 0
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

通过实验测量玩家在标准型博弈中的策略成熟度,记录他们查看隐藏收益的行为,分析认知模式与决策偏差。

Abstract

This paper reports experiments designed to measure strategic sophistication, the extent to which players' behavior reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. Subjects played normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to look up hidden payoffs as often as desired, one at a time, while automatically recording their look-ups. Monitoring information search allows tests of game theory's implications for cognition as well as decisions, and subjects' deviations from search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.

战略认知信息搜索纳什均衡实验经济学