How Risk Sharing May Enhance Efficiency of English Auctions
研究了英式溢价拍卖（EPA），发现向最高两位竞拍者发放奖金能在保持事后效率的同时，吸引风险规避的竞拍者，并可能改善事前帕累托效率。
English auctions are known to be ex post efficient under various circumstances. However, they are inefficient ex ante for risk-averse seller and bidders. Our analysis of the English premium auction (EPA) reveals that, while maintaining ex post efficiency, awarding a premium to the highest two bidders makes the auction more attractive to all risk-averse bidders. This result is remarkably general, as it holds with possible interdependent bidder valuations and affiliated types. When bidders exhibit independent types, the EPA can also benefit a risk-averse seller and therefore strictly improve ex ante, or interim, Pareto efficiency of the English auction.