Race to the Bottom? Local Tax Break Competition and Business Location
研究了地方间税收优惠竞争如何影响企业选址，发现限制地方政府提供税收优惠对均衡选址影响不大，但能降低30%的税收减免总额，表明竞争主要降低了流动企业的税负，而非显著影响选址效率。
I analyze how competition between localities affects tax breaks and business location decisions. I first use a geographic instrument to show that spatial competition substantially increases firm-specific property tax breaks. I then use this pattern to estimate a model of localities competing for mobile firms by offering tax exemptions. In counterfactual exercises, restricting which levels of government can offer tax breaks has little effect on equilibrium business locations but lowers total exemptions by 30 percent. This suggests that local tax break competition primarily reduces taxes for mobile firms and is unlikely to substantially affect the efficiency of business location.