The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting
通过贷款实验，发现弱排斥威胁会破坏隐性契约，导致信贷关系更频繁破裂和贷款规模缩小。
Implicit contracts can mitigate moral hazard in labor, credit, and product markets. The enforcement mechanism underlying an implicit contract is the threat of exclusion: the agent fears that he will lose future income if the principal breaks off the relationship. This threat may be very weak in environments where an agent can appropriate income-generating resources provided by the principal. For example, in credit markets with weak creditor protection, borrowers may be able to appropriate borrowed funds and generate investment income without requiring further loans. We examine implicit contracting in a lending experiment where the threat of exclusion is exogenously varied. We find that weak exclusion undermines implicit contracting: it leads to a more frequent breakdown of credit relationships as well as to smaller loans. Data, as supplemental material, are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2572 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.