Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms
基于100个国家1987-2000年数据，研究发现内幕交易法律首次执行后，分析师跟踪数量增加，尤其在资本市场自由化程度低的新兴市场国家，且投资者保护强的国家反应较弱。
ABSTRACT Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987–2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.