Futures for farmers: Hedging participation and the Mexican corn scheme
研究了发展中国家农民不愿参与期货对冲的原因，利用墨西哥玉米计划的数据分析发现，有限参与可能源于理性计算而非惰性，这对补贴政策有启示。
Abstract Administered commodity price schemes in developing countries have proved ineffective in raising farmers' incomes, and price stabilisation through futures markets is increasingly advocated as the alternative policy objective. A potential difficulty is that farmers tend not to hedge extensively, even in developed countries where access to futures markets is long established. Explanations for this reluctance are examined here with context provided by the Mexican hedging programme, which incorporates financial incentives to spur adoption. Applying representative data for corn to a well-known analysis of the hedging decision suggests that limited participation may reflect rational calculation rather than farmer ‘inertia’. A policy implication is that permanent access subsidies are difficult to justify from the national perspective.